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Abstract This paper contributes to the growing line of
thought in bioethics that respect for autonomy should not
be equated to the facilitation of individualistic self deter-
mination through standard requirements of informed con-
sent in all healthcare contexts. The paper describes how in
the context of donation for living related liver transplan-
tation (LRLT) meaningful, responsible decision making is
often embedded within family processes and its negotia-
tion. We suggest that good donor risk communication in
families promote ‘‘conscientious autonomy’’ and ‘‘reﬂec-
tive trust’’. From this, the paper offers the suggestion that
transplant teams and other relevant professionals have to
broaden their role and responsibility for risk communica-
tion beyond proper disclosure by addressing the impact of
varied psychosocial conditions on risk interpretation and
assessment for potential donors and family stakeholders. In
conclusion, we suggest further research questions on how
professional responsibility and role-taking in risk commu-
nication should be morally understood.
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Introduction
When healthy individuals consent to undergo an operation
solely to beneﬁt another, the communication of the risks of
that operation bears a special weight and signiﬁcance. Risk
communication can change processes of decision making
and shape the moral signiﬁcance of decisions to donate or
not to donate, supporting but also disturbing the complex
collaborative endeavors of care and decision making within
which this communication takes place. This paper offers an
analysis of two complex cases of risk communication in the
situation of a family member donating a part of his liver to
a child. The two examples are exceptions rather than
exemplary cases, but they can help us draw attention to
aspects of risk communication in families that often go
unnoticed when they go well. We will argue in this article
that important aspects of risk communication are difﬁcult
to grasp in the terms of a dyadic relation of physician and
donor; they can only be understood when placed in the
broader social context of the changes that a family under-
goes in the process of decision making. Starting with these
two complex cases, we explore what risk communication
entails in this context of a family living through transitions.
In the bioethics literature, risk communication has been
most discussed as part of informed consent procedures.
Without denying the importance of informed consent, we
direct attention to other interactions and processes of
change in which risk communication gives and gains
signiﬁcance.
Risk communication gains and gives signiﬁcance in
family processes that overlap with decision making. Risk
communication, we argue, should be understood in the
context of giving signiﬁcance to transitions in the family,
not only as an unhampered exchange of information
between potential donor and professionals. This means
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professionals who disclose risk information; it also
depends on family interactions that are beyond the control
of professionals. To understand what good risk commu-
nication in this family context may be, we propose a
broad notion of autonomy, and we outline the reﬂective
kind of trust in family relations that can support such a
form of autonomy.
There are no a priori given roles that professionals can
and should play in the transitions that these families go
through. The tradition of respect for autonomy and respect
for the private sphere of the family of patients and donors
holds that the interference of professionals in family mat-
ters should be limited. We argue, however, that the offer of
living related liver transplantation (LRLT) for a child in
itself is not morally neutral: it conveys the message that
LRLT is an acceptable option and that parents can be
expected to feel responsible to donate a piece of liver to
their child. The offer of LRLT already interferes in family
life. Professionals should therefore try to interfere in a good
way, rather than refrain from interference. Although pro-
fessionals cannot lay down the terms for risk communi-
cation in the family, they can adjust their own ‘share’ in
family processes. We will conclude our article by sug-
gesting further research questions on how the professional
responsibility and role-taking should be morally
understood.
This discussion of donor risk communication is based on
a study that is part of the research project entitled ‘‘Living
Related Donation: A Qualitative Ethical Study,’’ carried
out at the University Medical Center Groningen. For this
study, we conducted semi-structured interviews with 22
parents, two uncles, and one aunt of 12 families who had
considered living liver donation for an infant transplant
patient. A short conversation was held with a second aunt
in the course of the interview with her husband. This
conversation is also used in this paper. In the case of four
families LRLT had been done. In the case of the other eight
families, LRLT had been postponed or abandoned for
various medical or psychosocial reasons. If LRLT was
postponed it was often kept as a safety net. In that case, the
family would wait for a post-mortem donor liver, but when
the condition of the child deteriorated too much on the
waiting list, they would opt for LRLT. In these eight
families, the patient had been transplanted with a post-
mortem graft. In addition, the weekly meetings of the liver
transplant team and the outpatient pediatric clinic were
attended.
The views in this paper are developed on the basis of
observations and interviews in one liver transplant center
with its own ways of handling donor risks. Yet, our pro-
posed ways of framing risk communication can be of
broader use to other centers and ethicists as well.
Complications in family processes
When Baber needed a liver graft from his uncle Jamal, his
transplantation became a contentious event. This uncle had
a special bond with his nephew, since he had always joined
Baber’s family, of Asian origin, in the hospital as an
interpreter. He was the best Dutch-speaking member in the
family. When both parents were deemed medically
unsuitable as donors, Jamal volunteered to donate. Jamal’s
wife reports that she had been very scared: ‘I was very
scared when he was going to donate; I didn’t know what
would happen. I tried to stop him, … but he didn’t listen to
anybody, he only saw the baby [Baber]. … He told me
there was only a small risk, but even then I was scared’.I n
this short account of fear about what could happen, she
recalls her husband’s disregard of risk: he thought the risks
were small and he listened to nobody: ‘he only saw the
baby’. Professionals seemed to have a more remote and
mediated presence in her account. When her husband told
her that there was only a small risk, he summarized the
general message he had picked up from professional risk
communication. However, she was neither impressed nor
reassured by this communication. Jamal indicates that his
wife and other family members had heard other, more
frightening stories about living donation. Jamal found the
risks small and acceptable, but the rest of his family had
very different ideas about the magnitude of the donor risks.
Since nobody could stop Jamal, Baber’s parents were
pressured by other family members to refuse the offer to
donate. Baber’s mother reported, ‘We didn’t want him to
donate, (me and my husband) because if something would
happen to him, we would feel very guilty and ashamed
before the family; we were very scared.’ However, they
were also pressured by Baber’s uncle to accept his offer.
He ﬁrst tried to persuade the whole family by explaining
how thorough the screening procedures for donor candi-
dates were. When the parents, fearing the reproach of other
family-members, later continued to oppose LRLT, Jamal
put them under more pressure. Uncle: ‘I told them; you
heard what the professor said; he has no more than four
weeks to live if we do not operate on him now. What do you
want? … If you give up on your child, please give him to
me.’ This way of framing their decision put Baber’s parents
in an even more difﬁcult position. They kept wavering,
agreeing one moment, withdrawing their consent in the
next moment. Finally, after the mediation of a generally
respected great-uncle, Jamal managed to get their consent
to his giving Baber a piece of his liver. After the trans-
plantation, both Baber and Jamal recovered. Jamal was a
family hero; however, Baber’s parents still had a difﬁcult
relationship with the rest of the family.
The donor decision in this case seems to meet the ideal
of informed consent; Jamal was well-informed, and there
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was clearly very motivated to donate since he resisted the
family pressures to withdraw from liver donation. Never-
theless the communication about donor risks in this family
seems far from ideal, especially because, as we will argue
below, it did not support the maintenance of trust relations
in the collaborative decision making process.
In another family, Elske, a mother of a liver transplant
patient and one of the potential donors, was overwhelmed
by the information about donor risks: she kept fretting
about them, unable to make up her mind. Many of her
family members were opposed to living liver donation. The
aunt of the patient connected doubts about Elske’s possible
donor status to speciﬁc expectations she had of mothers:
‘because I thought, being a woman, she is the one who
keeps the family rolling, what happens if she is in the
hospital?’ In the interview with Elske and her husband, the
differences in the way they discuss living donation and its
risk is striking. To Elske it was a practical and religious
issue, brought home to her by other family members:
I was also more sensitive to comments of others …
like how will things go with the family if you have
medical complications, such things …or are we not
going too far? [from a spiritual viewpoint]… I’ve
never faced such difﬁcult things.
To Elske’s husband, who was also screened, living donation
and its risk had been a more intellectual and religious issue.
In the interview he never mentioned practical concerns
about family care and positioned himself as a more
independent thinker, less sensitive to comments of family
members. He had studied Bible fragments that could have a
bearing on the question, and he had thoroughly considered
all the risk information given by professionals. Moved by
the suffering of his son, he became convinced that, if he
were a suitable donor, he should pursue living donation.
Elske’s concerns did not seem to have any salience to her
husband; according to him, she was under the inﬂuence of
the more traditional side of the family, where such things
were difﬁcult to discuss. Elske herself, keeping the family
rolling, seemed to lack space and peace of mind to
determine her position about living donation or to consider
its risks. She felt very frightened, but she also felt unable to
refuse to donate. ‘You don’t know what you’re at…, what
will happen to the family if something happens to me, these
things. They were the most difﬁcult things I ever encoun-
tered.’ This made it difﬁcult to give the risks and risk-
related fears a place in the decision making process. She
entered the donor trajectory, although thoughts about worst
case scenarios kept haunting her. Risk awareness seemed to
be paralyzing to the degree that refusal as well as consent to
donation was extremely difﬁcult. Even though she was
properly informed, as part of the informed consent
procedure, she felt unable to act. Information thus was not
enough to support autonomous decision making.
Donor risk communication: giving signiﬁcance to
changes
Elske’s fretting response to considerations of risk and the
familial tensions in Baber’s family point to problems with
donor risk communication that have rarely been discussed.
These problems can only be understood if we pay closer
attention to the family setting in which living liver dona-
tion is considered. Up till now the communication of donor
risks has been discussed mainly as an issue of informed
consent. Those discussions of donor informed consent are
primarily concerned with donors’ frequent disregard of the
risk to themselves. Such disregard of risk has been
observed in other studies and was also reported by different
respondents in our study (Fellner and Marshall 1968;
Fellner and Marshall 1970; Crowly-Matoka et al. 2004;
Knibbe and Verkerk 2008). Many donors spontaneously
decide to donate, without considering the risks of living
donation. Several ethicists point out that these donor atti-
tudes call for a rethinking of common models of informed
consent and autonomous agency (Sauder and Parker 2001;
Spital 2004; Crouch and Elliot 1999). The fretting response
to risk communication poses fewer problems in view of
informed consent norms as they are commonly understood,
because this response seems to testify of awareness of the
donor risks involved: the information about the possibility
of death or of compromised recovery after donation has
clearly been picked up by those fretting about risks. Yet
this risk awareness can be disturbing or troublesome in the
experience of parents as potential donors.
The complexities we sketched above can be viewed as
problems of adjusting and giving signiﬁcance to the tur-
bulent changes in family life brought about by the infant’s
life-threatening illness. Therefore, the communication of
donor risks should not only support individual decision
making, it should also be supportive of these changes a
family is going through. Jody Halpern and Margaret Little
point out that risk communication should take into account
that people can only do something with the information
given if they are able to maintain a sense of themselves and
a sense of meaningful connections to a world that is rela-
tively safe and familiar (Halpern and Little 2008). In the
context of living related liver transplantation this task of
maintaining or ﬁnding a new sense of self and (life-) world
is a collaborative family process. Families undergo changes
and are sometimes even disrupted: in the case of Elske,
there was a need for reconsidering the habitual practice of
family care. In the case of Jamal, established family rela-
tionships came to stand under pressure.
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responding to the needs of the sick child while providing
continuity in spite of the child’s life-threatening disease.
The new caring needs of the sick child put extra burdens on
parents. In order to cope with these extra burdens, the par-
ents regulated attention, caring activities and emotions in
speciﬁc ways. Role divisions between parents often helped
to distribute burdens of care. Paying attention to risks could
also become one of the ‘burdens’ that were distributed.
If we follow how attention to donor risks is distributed
among family members, risk communication can be con-
fronted with the kind of critical perspective on gender or
other inequalities with which divisions of labor or distri-
butions of burdens in care are often viewed. Gendered
divisions in care for the sick child and family can make
things easier. However, as is often the case with role
divisions, they are not always well balanced. In some
families, it seems that mothers carry the heaviest burdens
of care. The donor risks thus gained signiﬁcance in the
context of gendered social schemes. Elske’s fretting
responses to risk communication can be placed in this
context. It is difﬁcult to sketch role divisions on the basis of
interviews. The frayed edges of role divisions often
become more visible in what people do than in what people
say about them. Yet, some differences in the stories of
Elske and her husband can help to lay out the precarious
position Elske found herself in. In the interviews in Elske’s
family, it seemed that the continuity of family care was
particularly dependent on her. With this lonely and big
responsibility, she could not ﬁnd the peace of mind to give
attention to donor risk a place in her decision. Elske did not
consider the risks. Instead, she was haunted by worst-case
scenarios. Rather than making up her mind, she postponed
the decision and hoped that the doctors would decide that
she was not a suitable donor.
Although Elske did not become a donor in the end, her
reception of donor risk communication seems similar to
donor experiences described by Forsberg et al. They write:
‘Decisions were arrived at and preparations were made,
often with the donor in a state of mental stress and trau-
matized by the whole situation’ (Forsberg et al. 2004).
Instead of enabling potential donors to decide and prepare,
risk awareness undermined their capacity to respond to the
problems of their situation.
Elske found no space to negotiate her position in family
care. In her case we could say that the donor risks gained
signiﬁcance in speciﬁc family care practices. However,
contemplating the donor risks did not lead to giving or
ﬁnding new meaning in the changing family practice. Elske
was placed in a social scheme that was difﬁcult to revise.
With ﬁve children, one of whom had a life-threatening
disease, Elske had great difﬁculties meeting all the
demands of care made on her. In this position she could
hardly think about the additional problems posed by living
donation and its risks. She found herself alone with con-
cerns that had no salience to her husband and with too
heavy a burden of care.
In Baber’s family, family relations were challenged by
different attitudes toward LRLT and the risks it involved.
The measure of readiness to donate or to accept an offer to
donate can potentially be seen as an expression of one’s
commitments to the recipient or to others. Different risk
attitudes and reactions to the option of living donation can
conﬁrm as well as challenge relations in the family. Con-
templating the donor risks can give new and sometimes
threatening meanings to family relations. In Baber’s fam-
ily, Jamal saw living liver donation as an afﬁrmation of the
special bond he had with his nephew. Many other family
members had made it clear that they would blame Baber’s
parents for any resulting harm to Jamal if they gave their
consent to LRLT. Jamal on the other hand tried to convince
his family that donation was his own decision and
responsibility, and that any harm to him could not be
blamed on Baber’s parents. He did, however, reproach
Baber’s parents for withholding their consent to LRLT and
thereby endangering the life of their child. Baber’s parents
had very little room to articulate their own position. They
did not manage to position themselves with regard to the
donor risks. Instead, the risks and the family’s opposing
understandings of risks positioned them either as blame-
worthy or as careless parents. In that way, considering the
donor risks led to new moral meanings in this family.
Good risk communication
When LRLT is seen as a family matter and risk commu-
nication as a collaborative process that gains and gives
signiﬁcance in changing family circumstances, good risk
communication must be understood in this context of
family transitions. The conditions or barriers for decision
making of individual donor candidates are created in
family context. Therefore, family relations and practices
are important: donor risks gain signiﬁcance in these family
relations and practices. However, the maintenance of good
family relations and values in this period of transition can
also be seen as a valuable end in itself. The changing
signiﬁcances given to family relations in the light of donor
risks should therefore be taken into account in notions of
good risk communication. We propose ﬁrst, that risk
communication should be framed by a broad notion of
autonomy in which psychosocial conditions for reﬂection
are addressed. Second, we propose that good risk com-
munication should also support the maintenance of trust in
family relations. After outlining these notions of autonomy
and trust, we indicate how the importance of family
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their physicians into perspective.
Reﬂective endorsement of norms that govern liver
donation
As Elske’s story illustrates, adequate and relevant infor-
mation is not by itself sufﬁcient for making a decision. As
was shown, Elske was well informed but felt unable to act,
she was unable to give either consent or refusal. In order to
participate and act out of her own accord in the practice of
LRLT, she would have to become more familiar with the
norms that govern this medical practice. Before LRLT
became an issue she lived according to her views of good
motherhood, good church membership, good daughter-
hood, but in this new and unfamiliar practice of LRLT, the
norms that had governed her life did not tell her what to do.
One of the challenges of the transitional period leading
up to transplantation, becoming accustomed to an unfa-
miliar medical practice, also has implications for notions of
autonomy. The notion of ‘‘conscientious autonomy’’ put
forward by Rebecca Kukla can be useful in this context
(Kukla 2005). Kukla describes conscientious action as
‘responsible commitment to the norms that govern it’ (p
38). In this view, actions are not autonomous because they
were self chosen: actions are autonomous when they are in
keeping with someone’s commitments. Kukla further
argues that conscientiousness or responsible commitment
to certain norms or practices require that one is capable of
stepping backward and questioning commitments. To
become autonomous in this sense, after ‘‘tumbling’’ into an
unfamiliar medical practice with its own particular norms
and habits, parents have to reorient themselves. The report
of Elske’s husband about his decision to be screened for
donation can be seen as a textbook example of reﬂexive
endorsement of norms. He studied and reconsidered both
the norms inherited in his religious community, and the
norms that governed the medical practice of LRLT. After
thorough reﬂection, he became convinced that living liver
donation was a good option. Elske however, in her position
in which the family seemed to be dependent on her being
able to run it, was unable to take such a distance, to step
backward and question her commitments. Professional
concerns about the autonomy of potential donors are
therefore best addressed by creating conditions for the
process of reorienting; interpreting; and responding.
Reﬂective trust
To create conditions for such a form of conscientious
autonomy, parents or other donor candidates need a
speciﬁc kind of trust from their partners or other family
members that are involved in decision making. We propose
that good trust here is a reﬂective kind of trust in which
family members allow each other to step backwards and
question the norms that guide decisions about living
donation. Trust can support such conscientious autonomy,
but some forms of trust can exercise moral pressure and
thus make it difﬁcult to step backward. As Margaret Urban
Walker points out, in trusting others, we hold them
responsible. ‘I propose then that we think of interpersonal
trust generically as a kind of reliance on others whom we
expect (..) to behave as relied upon (e.g. in speciﬁed ways,
in ways that fulﬁll an assumed standard, or in ways so as to
achieve relied-on outcomes) and to behave that way in the
awareness (..) that they are liable to be held responsible for
failing to do so or to make reasonable efforts to do so.’
(Walker 2006, p. 60) Trust thus involves normative
expectations toward others, which may also take the form
of moral pressure.
To identify the kind of trust that supports conscientious
autonomy it is useful to distinguish different forms of
reliance involved in trust. Trust can be a kind of reliance on
others to do something or to be disposed to do something.
Some family members may trust a mother to accept the
risks of liver donation for the sake of the child. If trust
takes that form, they may completely lose trust in that
mother if she refuses to become liver donor, independent of
her motives to do so. According to some accounts of trust,
trust also entails belief in the (favorable) motives of the
other (Walker 2006; Hardin 2002). A husband may trust his
wife to donate out of love for her child and not because of
the status or admiration that she could gain from donating.
In long lasting close relationships of extended commit-
ment, one can trust the other to have a certain set of
motivations in connection to oneself (Walker 2006). We
propose that in reﬂective trust the reliance on this set of
motivations and commitments toward the child and family
members can be uncoupled from reliance on the other to do
something speciﬁc, i.e. to become a liver donor for the
child. This form of trust was expressed by the husband of a
donor candidate, who, in reaction to his wife’s hesitations
about donation, said: ‘Margaret does everything that is in
her power and I do what is in my power.’ This way he
indicated that his trust in her commitments to her child and
family or in her ‘set of motivations’ remained undamaged
even if she would refuse to donate. He showed that the
norm that a mother does everything for her child could be
questioned without calling her commitment to her child
into question.
In the context of LRLT, we propose that good trust
implies a form of ‘‘reﬂective trust,’’ that is, that it should
take some distance from inherited normative expectations
toward parents or other family members involved. In most
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tions were addressed by family members. They actively
pushed back against normative expectations. In that way
they showed that the continuation of trust relations in the
family was not dependent on the fulﬁllment of speciﬁc
expectations to donate. By contrast, the families of Elske
and Baber failed to reconsider some of the inherited nor-
mative expectations that governed decision making.
In sum, good risk communication should create condi-
tions for conscientious autonomy and for the continuation
of trust relationships in families. Both, conscientious
autonomy and the proposed reﬂective trust in families,
depend on whether family members, facing changes, man-
age to push back against the inherited normative expecta-
tions in order to explore future changes. As the cases of
Elske and Baber show such normative expectations are
often gendered; class bound; and formed in speciﬁc reli-
gious or cultural communities. Thus, in the context of
family decision making, the capacity to understand infor-
mation about risks completely, seems less important than
forming good interpretations about the signiﬁcance of the
donor risks in the family. In the stories of our respondents, it
is difﬁcult to isolate risk communication from other issues;
it is strongly interwoven with other family processes.
Implications for professional risk communication
If family processes and risk communication are so closely
connected, questions arise about what professionals can
and should do to support good risk communication. Further
research is needed to get more clarity about good role-
taking of professionals in donor risk communication.
Below we ﬁrst describe the kinds of roles that professionals
can take, roles that were ascribed to professionals by donor
candidates, their partners and other family members. We
then formulate the questions that have to be addressed in
further research, in order to judge which roles professionals
should take in this broadly understood process of risk
communication.
On the basis of our study we can outline the roles that
were ascribed to professionals by parents or other family
members. In the stories of parents, two types of roles are
ascribed to professionals in the family processes. The team
helps families interpret and adapt to changes, but it is also
part of the changes: professionals represent the new med-
ical practice in which a family must participate. These roles
of guiding changes in family life that result from treating
the child’s disease and of representing an unfamiliar
medical practice can be seen as the two roles in which
professional risk communication gains signiﬁcance for
parents or other potential donors in the family. When
professionals communicate donor risks, they do not merely
sketch possible outcomes and their probabilities. With their
style of talking about risk, they also show something to
potential donors and partners about the kind of medical and
moral practice they have entered.
Respondents registered the attitudes of professionals
toward donor risks in different ways. In interviews,
respondents remembered very little about the details of the
risks that were communicated–the mortality and morbidity
statistics or the speciﬁc complications that can occur after
liver donation. What they remember is the serious tone and
emphasis with which risks were communicated and the
concerns in the transplant team about these risks. Respon-
dents had collected a general message from this profes-
sional communication. In the interviews, they speak about
small; big; considerable; or acceptable risks. As one mother
reported: ‘They were very clear about the risks, with per-
centages and so forth, I don’t remember exactly, only that
there was a big risk.’ Some respondents felt impelled to
give the risks a great deal of thought, whereas others
entrusted risk considerations to professionals. When
recalling encounters with professionals in which risks were
communicated, the two aforementioned roles of profes-
sionals alternated. Sometimes respondents took the general
message about donor risk as guidance in their own orien-
tation on questions about living donation; sometimes they
took their observations about professionals and professional
thoughts and feelings to represent the character of the
medical practice they had entered.
Depending on the roles as guides or representatives that
professionals receive or manage to play, they have different
entrances for supporting risk communication in the family.
In a family like Baber’s, where stories from different origins
circulated about the dangers of living donation, the role of
doctors as representative of this unfamiliar medical practice
could be an important one. As matters stood, the family
(with the exception of Jamal and Baber’s parents) had only
second- or third-hand stories about living donation and its
risk. If Jamal’s wife and other opposing family members
were invited for a direct conversation, professionals could
try to situate the diverse messages and frightening stories
about living donors, to try to come to shared understandings
about the donor risks and the ways they are handled in this
transplant center. When risk information is explicitly
communicated as a kind of knowledge that is embedded in a
medical subcommunity with certain values, worries, and
interests of its own, family members can relate in their own
ways to this new and unfamiliar community.
In Elske’s family the guiding role of the transplant team,
in helping this family handle the changes in family life,
could maybe be enlarged to help her make up her mind. The
guiding role of professionals in the transplant team (doctors,
psychologists or social workers) could be understood in a
way similar to that of the ‘‘gift-exchange gatekeeper,’’ as
154 M. Knibbe, M. Verkerk
123Fox and Swazey describe the role played by medical teams
in family-processes. They write that since the gift of an
organ puts strains on family relations, gift-exchange gate
keeping implies negotiating, mediating and interpreting
what happens between family members (Fox & Swazey
1974). In the cases they describe, the involvement of social
workers or psychiatrists sometimes brought about signiﬁ-
cant changes in family relations, before everyone agreed
with the living donor kidney transplantation. It is however
the question how far such interference in family dynamics
should go. In Elske’s case, the usual conversation that the
social worker has with donor candidates about donation did
not help her to make up her mind. As we suggested above,
the problem could be that she lacked space and peace of
mind to think about living donation and its risk because the
whole family was dependent on her, or at least so it was
thought. Perhaps good risk communication in this family
would have to be accompanied by an examination and
revision of the gendered social schemes. However, the
question is whether that is something transplant teams can
or should have a role in.
In both families the options that professionals seem to
have to support good risk communication would mean
interfering not only in medical decisions but also in social,
normative, and even existential issues in families. The
question thus rises how far professional interference in
family issues should go, what kind of professionals should
be involved and what limits should be put to their inter-
ference. The account of good risk communication we gave
up to here ascribed great weight to family processes.
Family processes of giving signiﬁcance to changes had
impact on risk communication and vice versa, risk com-
munication had impact on family relations and care prac-
tices. The encounters in which professionals communicate
about the donor risks with potential donors are often not the
most central interactions in which the donor risks gain
signiﬁcance for potential donors. Furthermore, decision
making does not take place in a dyadic patient physician
relation; it takes place in a complex network of relations
involving potential donors; patients; family members; and
members of the transplant team. From our account about
risk communication, two diverging normative conclusions
can be drawn about professional responsibilities.
One could conclude that the responsibility of profes-
sionals in ensuring good risk communication should be
modest, since views on risk are most effected by family
relations and care practices in a family. In this view, pro-
fessional efforts to improve risk communication should not
intrude in this domain of the family. Professional modesty
and putting limits to the interference of professionals in
family relations and values is a way of enacting the prin-
ciple of respect for autonomy with an emphasis on negative
freedom. Refraining from too much interference is also a
way of dealing with cultural differences. In healthcare
relations, there is always a risk that the culturally and
institutionally inherited values and norms of professionals
come to dominate the values and norms of patients and
family members. Professional modesty can be a way of
avoiding such domination.
Although we share the concern that interference in
family life should not go too far, we also have to take into
account that the offer of LRLT in itself already has a big
impact on family life. Moreover, the offer of LRLT is not a
morally neutral offer: it involves speciﬁc ideas about the
acceptability of risks and sacriﬁces and the offer conveys
expectations about the responsibilities of parents and
family members. Parents and other family members have to
think about themselves and each other in new and unfa-
miliar terms to make up their minds about LRLT.
Taking this inevitable impact of the LRLT offer on
family life into account, we think that further research
about risk communication should ask how professionals
could help to bend the inﬂuence that the offer of LRLT
inevitably has in the best possible direction. To address this
question, descriptive as well as normative work needs to be
done. The descriptions we gave of how family members
saw professional roles in risk communication need to be
complemented by descriptions of the views of profession-
als on their roles and relations and on the informed consent
norms that guide their interactions. Only then can we
address the more normative questions about what good
professional risk communication is and how the informed
consent procedure is best understood in the context of
LRLT.
Concluding remarks
The signiﬁcance of donating or not donating in a family
cannot be deﬁned by the potential donor alone; it is carried
by different family-members. Attitudes towards donor risks
in the time leading up to transplantation account for a great
part of the moral meanings. Family attitudes toward the
risks to donors and the negotiations and interpretations of
risk attitudes in the decision making process make living
donation or refusal to donate morally acceptable or unac-
ceptable to family and professionals. At least as important
as individual donor considerations are the connections
between considerations of risk of the different participants
in this practice.
The different attitudes were connected and adjusted in
processes of familial care and redeﬁning of familial rela-
tions–processes that also interfered with decision making.
Giving attention to risk was often one of the many burdens
that were divided in these processes among parents and
professionals. With their diverse forms of attention to
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fears and concerns, in different positions in the collabora-
tive endeavor of family care and in relations to the patient,
donor, or other family members. When different attitudes
toward living donation and its risk seemed to challenge
family relations, family members often tried to interpret
and accept each other’s attitudes in more harmless ways, in
order to reduce pressures.
In the two cases we discussed, family members took, or
allowed each other, little space to negotiate their position in
care or in family relations. Respondents did not place
themselves; they were placed in a social scheme that was
difﬁcult to revise. Respondents’ positions in social schemes
of family care and family relations could dispose them to
attend to donor risks in certain ways. It seems that a certain
ﬂuidity in role divisions is required to give donor risks a
place in decision making: in reﬂective trust, family mem-
bers allowed each other to step back and question the
norms that guided decisions about donation without calling
the more general background commitment to the child or to
other close family members into question. By contrast,
rigidity of roles that were not open to reinterpretation could
make it very difﬁcult to place the donor risks in the course
of decision making.
Although good risk communication depends largely on
family processes and relations that are beyond the control
of professionals in the transplant team, it also depends on
the relations between family and team and the roles that the
team and its professionals played for a family. On the basis
of our study we outlined the roles that were ascribed to
professionals by donor candidates and their families. Pro-
fessionals received different roles in the processes of
change a family was going through; they could be seen as
guides in a turbulent time, or as representatives of an
unfamiliar medical practice. In some families, medical
professionals –as representatives of an unfamiliar practice–
can support risk communication by expressing the team’s
concerns about the donor risks and the ways they are
handled. By making potential donors familiar with the
concerns and norms that govern the practice of living liver
donation, professionals can create conditions for consci-
entious autonomy. In other families, members of the
transplant team may need to examine how gendered role
divisions have a bearing on the signiﬁcance of living
donation and its risk.
To judge how professional roles in processes of risk
communication can best be understood, further research is
needed in which the understandings of professionals about
their roles and relations are mapped and critically com-
pared to the understandings that families have about
professional roles and relations. On the basis of such
research, inherited normative understandings about the
scope and limits of professional roles in the complex net-
works of relations between family members and team
members can be reconsidered.
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